

## Passive SSL Decryption

### BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

#### A. Field of Invention

5 The present invention relates generally to the field of encryption/decryption. More specifically, the present invention is related to monitoring/analyzing encrypted network data.

#### B. Discussion of Prior Art

10 Modern communication systems benefit from a myriad of network analysis applications implementing various services based upon monitoring and analyzing network traffic data. For example, security applications analyze network traffic in order to detect intrusions and identify attempts directed towards attacking a network's infrastructure. Similarly, e-commerce systems utilize billing applications to analyze network traffic data in order to bill subscribers/clients. Likewise, capacity planning applications analyze network traffic in order to detect patterns 15 associated with resources usage and evaluate the need for further investment in equipment (or addition of services).

In a typical network analysis application, network traffic passing between a client and a server is monitored and copied (by network equipment) to the application in a manner whereby

the flow of real network traffic is not disturbed. The analysis application processes the received copies of the network traffic data by parsing the content of the traffic and logging all activity.

5 Networks are evolving as an important business tool as business transactions are increasingly performed over networks such as the Internet. As such transactions require security and privacy, the network traffic data associated with such transactions is encrypted. The standard encryption protocol, over a network such as the Internet, is the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol.

10 SSL is a protocol developed by Netscape® for transmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL is an intermediate network layer, running between the TCP/IP network layer and the higher application layer (HTTP, IMAP, etc.). SSL works by using a private key to encrypt data exchanged between a client and a server. A client, such as an Internet browser (e.g., Netscape Navigator® or Internet Explorer®), supporting SSL is able to talk to a server, such as an 15 e-commerce web site, and use the SSL protocol to obtain confidential user information, such as credit card numbers. By convention, URLs require an SSL connection start with HTTPS instead of HTTP. The SSL protocol uses cryptographic mechanisms to guarantee that the traffic cannot be decrypted within a reasonable time-frame.

A typical SSL encryption mechanism has two phases: a session establishment phase and an encryption phase. In the session establishment phase, the client and server negotiate a symmetric secret key. To negotiate, the client and server use an asymmetric process where the server uses its private key and the client uses the server's public key to exchange data. In the 5 encryption phase, the negotiated symmetric secret key is used by both sides to encrypt and decrypt messages.

A typical SSL session between a sender and a receiver is established in four steps. In step 1, the sender sends a "HELLO" message to the receiver containing random data. In step 2, the 10 receiver forwards the sender his/her public key embedded in a signed certificate. In step 3, the sender encrypts a shared secret key and a "CHANGE CIPHER SPEC" switch (to determine the proper cipher to use) using the receiver's public key and sends it to the receiver. In step 4, the receiver sends a reply using the shared secret key (after decrypting the information in step 3 with the receiver's private key) and a "finished" message. At this point in the session, both the sender 15 and the receiver (or the client and the server) are ready to begin secure communications. Using the record protocol, all data that passes between the two parties are encrypted and hashed, and the recipient checks this hash upon decryption to make sure that the data has not been modified during transit.

In SSL, the communications protocol headers are passed in plaintext; only the application header and actual data sent to the application is cryptographically protected. The encryption and integrity protection for the data (and not the communications as in IPSec, which protects both) are handled by the record protocol. The negotiation of new cryptographic algorithms and keys are handled by the handshake protocol. Finally, any errors that have occurred during an SSL session are handled by the alert protocol. Additionally, SSL maintains its security state based on the session associated with a particular set of host addresses and ports.

Prior art network analysis applications suffer from a serious drawback in not being able to analyze encrypted traffic. For example, in a scenario where a client and server establish a secure communication link (e.g., via the SSL protocol) and a network device copies a network analysis application with data exchanged between the client and the server, prior art network analysis applications are unable to monitor and analyze the received data as it is encrypted, thereby rendering such applications useless in such a scenario.

As described in prior art systems in the field of analyzing encrypted traffic, a solution involves the use of encryption termination devices, wherein the functions of serving the content and encrypting it are divided. For example, an encryption termination device receives encrypted data from clients, decrypts such data, and passes the decrypted data onto servers. If traffic analysis needs to be performed, then network equipment between the encryption termination

device and the servers copies the non-encrypted traffic to an analysis station running the network traffic data analysis application. This option is limiting as it affects the operation of the servers and requires modification to their application logic. Moreover, it opens a security hole as traffic needs to travel non-encrypted on part of the path between the servers and clients. This defeats  
5 the purpose of encryption.

Whatever the precise merits, features, and advantages of the above cited prior art systems, they fail to achieve or fulfill the purposes of the present invention.

## 10 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention provides for a passive secure socket layer (SSL) probe, working in conjunction with network equipment and an external entity (such as a network data analysis application, a network device, etc.), wherein the network equipment: (a) facilitates the flow of data in a communication session (between a client and a server) and (b) forwards a copy of the  
15 data to the SSL probe. The data may include encrypted data in a secure communication session. The passive SSL probe includes a receiver, a symmetric session key generator, a decrypter, and a forwarder. The receiver collects data packets corresponding to the forwarded data (from the network equipment), orders the received data packets for a TCP session, and reconstructs the session content. The symmetric session key generator receives the session content for each TCP  
20 session from the receiver, when encrypted identifies SSL handshake information from the session

content, and identifies an encryption scheme and a symmetric session key from the SSL handshake information. The decrypter decrypts and identifies unencrypted session content for each TCP session, wherein the decryption is based upon the identified encryption scheme and the identified symmetric key. The forwarder forwards, for each session, the identified unencrypted session content to the external entity.

5

In an extended embodiment, the passive SSL probe further comprises a filter filtering identified unencrypted session content to isolate information pertinent to the external entity, wherein the forwarder forwards the isolated information pertinent to the external entity.

10

The present invention provides for a method for passive probing forwarded one or more TCP communication sessions between a client and a server, wherein the method comprising the steps of: (a) receiving forwarded data packets corresponding to the TCP communication sessions; (b) ordering the received data packets and reconstructing session content for each of the sessions; and (c) forwarding the session content to an external entity (such as a network data analysis application, a network device, etc.).

15

In one embodiment, at least one of the communication sessions in the above-mentioned method is encrypted (for example, via SSL), and, for each encrypted session, the method additionally comprising the steps of: (a) identifying, prior to the forwarding step, an encryption

20

scheme and a session key from the reconstructed content; and (b) decrypting session content based upon the identified encryption scheme and session key, wherein the forwarded session content is the decrypted session content.

5        The present invention also provides for a method for providing passive treatment of encrypted data, wherein the method is implemented in a passive secure socket layer (SSL) probe and comprises the steps of: (a) receiving data packets corresponding to the encrypted data, wherein the encrypted data is forwarded to the SSL probe from network equipment that facilitates the flow of encrypted data in a secure communication session between a client and a 10 server; (b) ordering the received data packets of a TCP session and reconstructing the session content; (c) identifying SSL handshake information from the session content; (d) identifying an encryption scheme and a symmetric session key from the identified SSL handshake information; (e) decrypting and identifying unencrypted session content, wherein the decryption is based upon the identified encryption scheme and the identified symmetric key; and (f) forwarding, for each 15 session, the identified unencrypted session content to an external entity (such as a network data analysis application, a network device, etc.).

In an extended embodiment, the above-mentioned method further comprises the step of filtering identified unencrypted session content to isolate information pertinent to the external

entity. Furthermore, in step (f) above, the method forwards only the isolated information pertinent to the external entity.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Figure 1 illustrates a system using the present invention's passive SSL probe.

Figure 2 illustrates a method depicting the flow of data through the present invention's passive SSL probe of Figure 1.

5 Figure 3 illustrates an example of the session criteria table, wherein the table defines the encrypted traffic identification policy.

Figure 4 shows the addition of a new SSL key to the SSL keys table.

Figure 5 shows the retrieval of an existing SSL key from the SSL keys table.

10 Figure 6 illustrates an example of a forwarding filter table which defines the portion of the traffic that needs to be forwarded to an external entity such as an analysis application.

**DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS**

While this invention is illustrated and described in a preferred embodiment, the invention may be produced in many different configurations. There is depicted in the drawings, and will 15 herein be described in detail, a preferred embodiment of the invention, with the understanding that the present disclosure is to be considered as an exemplification of the principles of the invention and the associated functional specifications for its construction and is not intended to limit the invention to the embodiment illustrated. Those skilled in the art will envision many other possible variations within the scope of the present invention.

20

The present invention provides for a passive SSL probe that offers passive treatment of encrypted traffic flowing between a client and a server. Whenever encrypted traffic is copied towards a network analysis application, it first arrives at the passive SSL probe. The passive SSL probe gathers the sequences of traffic coming from a client (and/or returning from a server),

5       assembles a whole session from the received sequences, and decrypts the assembled session.

While decrypting new sequences of traffic, the passive SSL probe of the present invention forwards each decrypted sequence to an external entity such as the analysis applications as if it wasn't encrypted.

10       Figure 1 illustrates system 100 using the present invention's passive SSL probe 102. In this example, client 104 and server 106 communicate via a secure SSL session over network 108. Networking equipment 110 is located along the communication path (between client 104 and server 106) and connects to passive SSL probe 102, which, in turn, is linked to network analysis application 112. Encrypted packets travel from client 104 to server 106, via networking equipment 110. Networking equipment 110 forwards received packets to the server 106, and also forwards a copy of the received packets (with the information identical to what is being sent to the server 106) to the passive SSL probe 102. Similarly, encrypted packets travel from server 15       106 to client 104, via networking equipment 110. Networking equipment 110 forwards received packets to the client 104, and also forwards a copy of the received packets (with the information identical to what is being sent to the client 104) to the passive SSL probe 102.

20

Figure 2 illustrates method 200 depicting the flow of data through the present invention's passive SSL probe of Figure 1. The accurate flow of operations is divided into four main parts: (1) receiving network traffic via a receiver (not shown) -- 202; (2) generating symmetric session keys via a symmetric session keys generator (not shown) -- 204; (3) decrypting traffic via a decrypter (not shown) -- 206; and (4) forwarding the decrypted traffic via a forwarder (not shown) -- 208. First, in step 202, the passive SSL probe receives the copied traffic from the network (more specifically, from network equipment 110 of figure 1). The copied traffic includes relevant encrypted sessions and irrelevant non-encrypted data.

10

Selection criteria for relevant traffic can include, but should not be limited to: the IP address of the server, TCP port number of the server, client network range, or other identifiers in the packet. Figure 3 illustrates an example of the session criteria table 300, wherein table 300 defines the encrypted traffic identification policy. Table 300 includes, but should not be limited to, the specification for the server IP, server TCP port number, and client IP address range. For example, in table 300 of figure 3, the example policy relates to traffic coming from any client to TCP port 443 of the server 1.1.1.1.

15

Returning to the discussion of figure 2, the passive SSL probe identifies the encrypted part of the traffic and rebuilds the session information. SSL traffic uses TCP for its transport

20

layer, so the probe receives all the packets, classifies them to TCP sessions, and, for each session, separately groups packets from the client and packets from the server. For each such group, the probe organizes the TCP packets by their sequence number and removes any TCP retransmission packet that generates duplicate information. After reconstructing the TCP session, the probe 5 collects the TCP data sequences, which include data representative of any SSL communications, and moves onto the second phase of generating symmetric session keys.

As a part of step 204, the passive SSL probe identifies the SSL handshake part of the SSL communication (where the client and server negotiate a symmetric encryption key). There are

10 two options through which the client and server could negotiate a symmetric encryption key. In the first option, both the client and the server decide to generate a new SSL encryption key, and they perform a full SSL handshake. During this handshake, the client and server negotiate an asymmetric key, using the server's public key for its encryption and the server's private key for its decryption. While the public key is transmitted as part of the negotiation process, the private

15 key is securely kept on the server, and this key must be supplied in advance to the passive SSL probe. Using the private key, the passive SSL probe decrypts the "ClientKeyExchange" message from the client and gets the asymmetric SSL key, together with its attached SSL session ID that passes inside the "ServerHello" message. These are kept in a table in the passive SSL probe memory where each SSL session ID is associated with its corresponding asymmetric SSL key.

20 Figure 4 shows the addition of a new SSL key to the SSL keys table 400. The key is built from

SSL session ID **402** and SSL key **404**. The Session ID appears in “ServerHello” message **406**, and the SSL key appears in “ClientKeyExchange” message **408**.

5 The second option is when both sides decide to reuse a previous asymmetric key. In this scenario, the client and server resume the SSL handshake, passing the information about the SSL session ID that represents the asymmetric SSL key. In this case, the passive SSL probe recognizes the SSL session ID inside the “ClientHello” message and brings the symmetric SSL key that was associated with the SSL session ID from its cached memory. Figure 5 shows the retrieval of an existing SSL key from the SSL keys table **500**. Key value **502** fits the SSL session 10 ID number **504** that appears in “ClientHello” message **506**. Together with the encryption key, the server and client also agree on the exact encryption scheme that will be used for the symmetric process, and exchange a pair of random numbers to be used for that SSL transaction. Having the encryption scheme, the random numbers and the asymmetric SSL key, the passive SSL probe moves to the third phase of figure 2.

15 Returning to the discussion of steps **204** and **206** of figure 2, the passive SSL probe uses the knowledge about the encryption scheme, the random numbers and the asymmetric SSL key to reconstruct the symmetric encryption key used for this SSL transaction. The passive SSL probe decrypts all of the SSL content that passes between the client and server. Most symmetric 20 encryption schemes advance the encryption key in parallel for the encryption and decryption of

both sides of the communication, so the passive SSL encrypts the two sides of the traffic independently in parallel. This generates the actual application data that was encrypted. This data corresponds to the information that the analysis applications (i.e., applications 112 of Figure 1) require. The passive SSL probe obtains the unencrypted information and moves to the fourth 5 phase of forwarding the decrypted traffic.

In step 208, the passive SSL probe has the complete information regarding content of the secure session. This information should be forwarded to the analysis application. However, it is possible that the analysis application doesn't require all of the content for its operation. The 10 present invention, in one embodiment, provides for a passive SSL probe equipped with (or a passive SSL probe that works in conjunction with) a filter that sorts the information and forwards only the relevant data that the application really needs. The probe uses one of several options in forwarding the traffic to the analysis application.

One embodiment involves forwarding the full communication. In this embodiment, the 15 passive SSL probe transmits the full information as full TCP connections that include the clear information from the encrypted session. Hence, an analysis device does not see any difference from any regular copy of clear session traffic that comes from the network.

In another embodiment, only one side of the communication, either the client's side or the server's side, is forwarded. For example, certain applications simply log the requests from the client and are not interested in the server's replies.

5        In yet another embodiment, the traffic is filtered according to a mask on the session content (e.g., identifying specific types of requests and forwarding only these sessions). Other options are possible, and it should be clear that the probe can decide which part of the information should be forwarded and what shouldn't, according to the application type.

10      Furthermore, as mentioned above, one specific embodiment allows for all the traffic to be forwarded without any filtering.

Figure 6 illustrates an example of a forwarding filter table **600** which defines the portion of the traffic that needs to be forwarded to the analysis application. It includes the specification for the traffic direction and content type. Policy **602** is an example of a policy that specifies 15 forwarding of client traffic only, wherein the traffic is HTTP post requests. Policy **604** is an example of a policy that specifies sending all the traffic – in both directions – wherein the traffic includes any content.

20      In order to have the private keys of the servers, the passive SSL probe imports the keys from a single or from multiple servers before starting to process the copied traffic. These keys are

kept in the probe's memory and are used whenever a session is received in which the server with the private key is active. Whenever a new server is added to or removed from the list of copied servers or a new set of keys is set on an existing server, the probe is modified with the key.

5        The passive SSL probe of the present invention is capable of receiving and transmitting traffic from either a single network interface or from multiple network interfaces. Also, the SSL probe is capable of receiving traffic from a single server or multiple servers and, similarly, is capable of forwarding that traffic to single or multiple analysis applications using any predefined logical relationships. Additionally, the passive SSL probe is capable of using any filtering policy  
10      on the traffic it receives to decide what part of that traffic should be and should not be decrypted. Hence, it is able to use various filtering policies to decide what part of the originally received traffic or the decrypted traffic should be forwarded to one or more of the analysis applications. The various phases can be implemented either in software or in hardware and can also be divided between multiple processors and units.

15      Furthermore, the present invention includes a computer program code based product, which is a storage medium having program code stored therein which can be used to instruct a computer to perform any of the methods associated with the present invention. The computer storage medium includes any of, but not limited to, the following: CD-ROM, DVD, magnetic  
20      tape, optical disc, hard drive, floppy disk, ferroelectric memory, flash memory, ferromagnetic

memory, optical storage, charge coupled devices, magnetic or optical cards, smart cards, EEPROM, EPROM, RAM, ROM, DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, and/or any other appropriate static or dynamic memory or data storage devices.

5            Implemented in computer program code based products are software modules for: (a) aiding in the reception of data packets corresponding to encrypted data, wherein the encrypted data is forwarded to an SSL probe from network equipment that replicates encrypted data corresponding to secure communication sessions between a client and server; (b) ordering said received data packets for a TCP session and reconstructing the session content; (c) identifying  
10          SSL handshake information from the session content; (d) identifying an encryption scheme and a symmetric session key from the identified SSL handshake information; (e) decrypting the session content, wherein the decryption is based upon the identified encryption scheme and the identified symmetric key; and (f) forwarding the identified unencrypted session content to an external entity, such as an analysis application.

15

## CONCLUSION

A system and method has been shown in the above embodiments for the effective implementation of a passive SSL decryption scheme and a probe implementing the same. While various preferred embodiments have been shown and described, it will be understood that there

5 is no intent to limit the invention by such disclosure, but rather, it is intended to cover all modifications falling within the spirit and scope of the invention, as defined in the appended claims. For example, the present invention should not be limited by type of filter used in the SSL probe, type of analysis application, type of network used for communications between client and server, type of encryption algorithm, software/program, computing environment, or specific

10 computing hardware.

The above enhancements are implemented in various computing environments. For example, the present invention may be implemented on a conventional IBM PC or equivalent, multi-nodal system (e.g., LAN) or networking system (e.g., Internet, WWW, wireless web). All

15 programming and data related thereto are stored in computer memory, static or dynamic, and may be retrieved by the user in any of: conventional computer storage, display (i.e., CRT) and/or hardcopy (i.e., printed) formats. The programming of the present invention may be implemented by one of skill in the art of communication/networking algorithms.